Who is affected
SignalWire FreeSwitch is affected by a code injection vulnerability that allows an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary commands, control calls, and extract configuration data and credentials. The record does not specify which versions of FreeSwitch are vulnerable, nor does it indicate whether this affects only certain deployment models (cloud, on-premise, or hybrid).
How to check whether this touches you
- Inventory all systems running SignalWire FreeSwitch, including version numbers and deployment location (cloud, on-premise, or hybrid).
- Establish whether each FreeSwitch instance is reachable from the internet or from an untrusted network segment; code injection typically requires network access to the affected service.
- Cross-reference your running versions against SignalWire's published security guidance; version strings can be spoofed or patched retroactively, so absence of a higher version number is a signal but not proof of vulnerability.
- Review firewall and network segmentation logs to identify which systems have inbound traffic to FreeSwitch ports and from which sources.
What to do
- Immediately consult SignalWire's official security advisory and remediation steps; apply patches or mitigations according to their guidance and CISA's BOD 26-04 timeline.
- If patches are not yet available for your version, restrict network access to FreeSwitch instances: remove internet-facing exposure, enforce strict firewall rules, and limit access to known, trusted administrative sources only.
- Enable and retain detailed logging of configuration changes, authentication events, and call control operations; configure log aggregation to a system outside the FreeSwitch host.
- If mitigations cannot be applied and internet exposure cannot be eliminated, escalate to your business continuity team; CISA's required action permits discontinuation of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
If you find you were exposed
Exploitation of code injection vulnerabilities typically occurs before disclosure becomes public, so retrospective investigation should focus on logs dating back several weeks or months before the CISA announcement. Check authentication logs for unauthorised administrative access, configuration change logs for unexpected modifications, and call records for anomalous call routing or destinations. If logs do not extend far enough to cover the period before the vulnerability was disclosed, consult your incident response team about data recovery options.