DORA: what it requires for testing, incident reporting and ICT third parties

DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) applies directly to credit institutions, payment and e-money institutions, investment firms, insurers, crypto-asset service providers and other financial entities. It requires a risk-based testing programme and, separately, threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) for the entities that competent authorities identify. An ordinary penetration test is not TLPT, but it can supply evidence for the testing programme and for a customer's third-party risk review.

Official text: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 – Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011

Who it applies to

Article 2(1) covers 20 categories of financial entity, points (a) to (t): credit institutions, payment institutions, account information service providers, electronic money institutions, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers (point (f) also names certain issuers), central securities depositories, central counterparties, trading venues, trade repositories, managers of alternative investment funds, management companies, data reporting service providers, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, insurance, reinsurance and ancillary insurance intermediaries, institutions for occupational retirement provision, credit rating agencies, administrators of critical benchmarks, crowdfunding service providers and securitisation repositories. Article 2(1)(u) separately names ICT third-party service providers. Article 2(2) uses "financial entities" for points (a) to (t) only.

Article 2(3) excludes several groups, including managers of alternative investment funds referred to in Article 3(2) of Directive 2011/61/EU, insurance and reinsurance undertakings referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2009/138/EC, institutions for occupational retirement provision whose pension schemes together have no more than 15 members, and insurance, reinsurance and ancillary insurance intermediaries that are micro, small or medium-sized enterprises. Article 2(4) lets Member States exclude certain further entities. Read Article 2(3) and (4) in full before relying on any exclusion. For ICT third-party service providers, DORA works through the contract terms that Articles 28 and 30 require financial entities to agree, and through the oversight framework for providers designated as critical (Articles 31 to 44).

Sources: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 2 (Official Journal)

Key dates

DateWhat happensSource
DORA enters into force, the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal on 27 December 2022 (Article 64, first paragraph).Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 64 (Official Journal)
DORA applies (Article 64, second paragraph).Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 64 (Official Journal)
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 on the content and time limits of major incident reports is published in the Official Journal.Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 (Official Journal)
The TLPT RTS, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, enters into force, the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal on 18 June 2025 (its Article 17).Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, Article 17 (Official Journal)

What DORA requires from a financial entity's security and ICT teams

DORA sets requirements in five areas: ICT risk management (Articles 5 to 16), ICT-related incident management and reporting (Articles 17 to 23), digital operational resilience testing (Articles 24 to 27), ICT third-party risk (Articles 28 to 30, with an oversight framework for critical providers in Articles 31 to 44) and information sharing (Article 45). The management body bears the ultimate responsibility for managing the entity's ICT risk (Article 5(2)(a)), and the ICT risk management framework must be documented and reviewed at least once a year, or periodically in the case of microenterprises, as well as after major ICT-related incidents (Article 6(5)).

The rules apply in proportion to size, overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of the entity's services, activities and operations (Article 4(1) and (2)). Article 16(1) goes further for a narrow group: small and non-interconnected investment firms, exempted payment institutions, certain institutions exempted under Directive 2013/36/EU, exempted electronic money institutions, and small institutions for occupational retirement provision. Articles 5 to 15 do not apply to them; instead they must put in place and maintain a sound and documented simplified ICT risk management framework. Its detailed content is set in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774. Whether an entity qualifies must be settled against the exact wording of Article 16(1), not against its size alone.

Digital operational resilience testing under Articles 24 to 27

Article 24 requires financial entities, other than microenterprises, to establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive testing programme with a range of assessments, tests, methodologies, practices and tools (Article 24(1) and (2)). The programme follows a risk-based approach (Article 24(3)) and tests are undertaken by independent parties, whether internal or external (Article 24(4)). Entities must have procedures and policies to prioritise, classify and remedy all issues revealed by the tests (Article 24(5)), and must ensure, at least yearly, that appropriate tests are conducted on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions (Article 24(6)).

Article 25(1) lists the kinds of test the programme must provide for, "such as": vulnerability assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing. Article 25(2) requires central securities depositories and central counterparties to perform vulnerability assessments before any deployment or redeployment of new or existing applications and infrastructure components, and ICT services supporting critical or important functions.

Articles 26 and 27 add threat-led penetration testing. Competent authorities identify the financial entities required to perform it (Article 26(8), third subparagraph); entities covered by Article 16(1) and microenterprises are excluded (Article 26(1)). Article 2 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 sets the identification criteria and requires TLPT authorities to require certain entities to perform TLPT, among them credit institutions identified as G-SIIs or O-SIIs, central securities depositories, central counterparties, and payment institutions, e-money institutions, trading venues and insurers above set thresholds, unless the assessment shows that TLPT is not justified for a given entity. A TLPT must take place at least every three years, and the competent authority may ask for a shorter or longer interval (Article 26(1)). It covers several or all critical or important functions and is performed on live production systems (Article 26(2)). Article 27(1) sets out requirements for every tester: the highest suitability and reputability, specific expertise in threat intelligence, penetration testing and red team testing, certification by an accreditation body or adherence to formal codes of conduct or ethical frameworks, an independent assurance or audit report on the sound management of TLPT risks, and professional indemnity insurance. Internal testers may be used only under the conditions in Article 27(2).

Where a penetration test fits, and how a TLPT differs

An ordinary penetration test of web, API, network or cloud assets is the kind of test Article 25(1) names. It can evidence Article 24 testing for the assets in its scope, and it gives a customer's risk team dated records of method, scope and reproducible findings. It is not a threat-led penetration test under DORA.

The TLPT RTS describes a structure that a per-scan test does not follow. It has a preparation phase, a testing phase with a threat intelligence step and a red team test, and a closure phase (Articles 9 to 12 of the RTS). A control team manages the risks of each TLPT and must ensure that the threat intelligence provider and external testers meet the requirements in Article 7(1) of the RTS, including a red team with defined staffing and experience. AssurePort's scans have no threat intelligence provider phase, no live red team exercise under a control team and no authority attestation. They are not TLPT and should not be presented as such.

For an entity that is not designated for TLPT, the obligation is the regular, risk-based programme in Articles 24 and 25. Repeatable penetration tests of internet-facing web and API assets, network exposure and cloud configuration are one practical way to produce that evidence. Article 26(11) required the TLPT RTS to be developed in accordance with the TIBER-EU framework, which the ECB publishes. For the difference between a penetration test and a scanner, see penetration testing versus vulnerability scanning.

ICT-related incident reporting: stages and time limits

Article 17(1) requires an ICT-related incident management process to detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents. Article 18(1) requires entities to classify ICT-related incidents and determine their impact on the basis of the criteria it lists; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 specifies those criteria further and sets the materiality thresholds for major incidents. Article 19(1) requires major ICT-related incidents to be reported to the relevant competent authority in accordance with Article 19(4), within the time limits laid down under Article 20.

The time limits are set in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5. There are three stages:

  • Initial notification: as early as possible, but in any case within four hours from the classification of the incident as major and no later than 24 hours from the moment the entity became aware of it (Article 5(1)(a)). If the incident is classified as major only after those 24 hours, the initial notification is due within four hours of classification (Article 5(2)).
  • Intermediate report: at the latest within 72 hours from the submission of the initial notification, even if the status or handling of the incident has not changed, followed by an updated intermediate report when regular activities have been recovered (Article 5(1)(b)).
  • Final report: no later than one month after the submission of the intermediate report or, where applicable, after the latest updated intermediate report (Article 5(1)(c)).

Where a major incident has an impact on the financial interests of clients, they must be informed without undue delay, together with the measures taken to mitigate its adverse effects (Article 19(3)). A penetration test can itself disrupt a service, and that disruption must go through the same classification process as any other incident. Plan tests against production systems with the incident process in view.

ICT third-party risk: what a SaaS vendor faces through its customers

Article 28(1) treats ICT third-party risk as an integral part of ICT risk. Article 28(3) requires entities to maintain a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services, at entity, sub-consolidated and consolidated levels. For ICT services supporting critical or important functions, Article 28(8) requires exit strategies. Article 28(7) lists grounds for terminating a contract, including a significant breach of law or contract and evidenced weaknesses in the provider's overall ICT risk management, in particular in how it ensures the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data.

Article 30(2) sets minimum contract terms for all ICT services. These include a clear description of functions and locations, provisions on availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality, the provider's obligation to assist, at no additional cost or at a cost determined ex-ante, when an ICT incident related to the service occurs, and its obligation to cooperate fully with competent and resolution authorities. Article 30(3) adds terms for services supporting critical or important functions, including ongoing monitoring rights and unrestricted access, inspection and audit rights for the financial entity and for the competent authority (Article 30(3)(e)).

The ESAs designate critical ICT third-party providers under Article 31(1)(a), and only those are subject to the Lead Overseer's direct powers in Article 35. A SaaS vendor that is not designated is not supervised under that regime, but its financial customers must include these terms in their contracts with it. In practice that means audit, access, incident-assistance and exit clauses in the contract. A vendor's own penetration test report can inform a customer's review, but it does not replace the audit right the contract grants. Which clauses apply to a given service is a question for legal advisers on both sides.

Penalties and enforcement under DORA

Article 50 gives competent authorities supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning powers, and Article 50(3) requires Member States to lay down rules on administrative penalties and remedial measures that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Article 51 governs how they exercise administrative penalties and remedial measures, including when they decide the type and level of a penalty. Article 52 allows Member States to decide not to lay down administrative penalties for breaches that are subject to criminal penalties under national law.

For critical ICT third-party providers, the Lead Overseer must adopt a decision imposing a periodic penalty payment where the provider does not comply with measures required under Article 35(1), points (a), (b) and (c), after at least 30 calendar days from the date it received notification of those measures. The payment is imposed daily until compliance is achieved, for no more than six months, and each may be up to 1% of the provider's average daily worldwide turnover in the preceding business year (Article 35(6) to (8)).

Obligations and where testing can contribute evidence

ReferenceWhat the text requiresWhere a penetration test can contribute evidence
Art. 5(2)(a)Management body responsibility

The management body bears the ultimate responsibility for managing the entity's ICT risk.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 5 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 6(1), 6(5)Documented ICT risk management framework, reviewed yearly

The entity must have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework, documented and reviewed at least once a year (periodically for microenterprises) and after major ICT-related incidents.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 6 (Official Journal)
Dated test reports and remediation records can feed that annual review, but they are not the framework itself.
Art. 16(1)Simplified framework for listed small entities

Articles 5 to 15 do not apply to the entities listed in Article 16(1); instead they must put in place and maintain a sound and documented simplified ICT risk management framework.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 16 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 17(1)ICT-related incident management process

Define, establish and implement an ICT-related incident management process to detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 17 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 18(1)Classify incidents and determine their impact

Classify ICT-related incidents and determine their impact based on the criteria in Article 18(1), as further specified in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 18 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 19(1), 19(4); RTS 2025/301 Art. 5(1)Report major ICT-related incidents

Report major ICT-related incidents to the relevant competent authority within the time limits laid down under Article 20, which Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 sets.

Source: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 24(1)-(3)Risk-based digital operational resilience testing programme

Financial entities, other than microenterprises, establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive testing programme that includes a range of assessments, tests, methodologies, practices and tools, following a risk-based approach.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 24 (Official Journal)
A penetration test documents its own scope and method, which helps show what the programme covered. The programme as a whole remains the entity's responsibility.
Art. 24(4)Tests by independent parties

Tests must be undertaken by independent parties, whether internal or external.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 24 (Official Journal)
A report does not by itself show who was independent; the entity has to assess tester independence and competence.
Art. 24(5)Prioritise, classify and remedy issues

Establish procedures and policies to prioritise, classify and remedy all issues revealed by testing.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 24 (Official Journal)
Findings with a reproducible proof and a status give a remediation record, and a repeat test shows whether a fix held.
Art. 24(6)At least yearly tests on systems supporting critical or important functions

Ensure, at least yearly, that appropriate tests are conducted on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 24 (Official Journal)
A penetration test covers only the assets in its scope, so it evidences this requirement only for those assets.
Art. 25(1)Kinds of test the programme must provide for

The programme must provide for appropriate tests such as vulnerability assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility, performance and end-to-end testing, and penetration testing.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 25 (Official Journal)
Penetration testing is named in this list, and so are vulnerability assessments and scans.
Art. 25(2)Vulnerability assessments before deployment (CSDs and CCPs)

Central securities depositories and central counterparties perform vulnerability assessments before any deployment or redeployment of new or existing applications and infrastructure components, and ICT services supporting critical or important functions.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 25 (Official Journal)
For these entities a scan run before a release can be such an assessment, but the entity decides whether it meets the requirement.
Art. 26(1), 26(8)TLPT for designated entities, at least every three years

Entities that competent authorities identify as required to perform TLPT, other than Article 16(1) entities and microenterprises, must carry out advanced testing by means of TLPT at least every three years; the competent authority may ask for a shorter or longer interval.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 26 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 26(2), 26(3)TLPT scope

A TLPT covers several or all critical or important functions and is performed on live production systems supporting them. Where ICT third-party service providers are included in its scope, the entity retains at all times full responsibility for ensuring compliance.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 26 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 26(8), 27(1)-(2)Who may perform TLPT

Testers must be highly suitable and reputable, have threat intelligence, penetration testing and red team expertise, be certified by an accreditation body or adhere to formal codes of conduct or ethical frameworks, provide an independent assurance or audit report on TLPT risk management, and carry professional indemnity insurance. Internal testers need authority approval and must meet the further conditions in Article 27(2).

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 27 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 26(6), 26(7)Closing reports and attestation

After reports and remediation plans are agreed, the entity provides the authority with a summary of findings, the remediation plans and documentation, and the authority provides an attestation confirming that the test was performed in accordance with the requirements.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 26 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 28(3)Register of information on ICT contracts

Maintain and update a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services, at entity, sub-consolidated and consolidated levels.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 28 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 30(2)Minimum contract terms for ICT services

Contracts describe functions and locations, set availability, integrity and confidentiality provisions, and oblige the provider to assist in ICT incidents and to cooperate with authorities.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 30 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 30(3)(e)Monitoring, access, inspection and audit rights

For services supporting critical or important functions, the entity has ongoing monitoring rights and unrestricted access, inspection and audit rights, including for the competent authority.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 30 (Official Journal)
A provider penetration test report can inform a customer review, but it does not exercise these rights.
Art. 28(8)Exit strategies

For ICT services supporting critical or important functions, put exit strategies in place.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 28 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 31(1)(a)Designation of critical ICT third-party providers

The ESAs, through the Joint Committee, designate the ICT third-party service providers that are critical for financial entities.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 31 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.
Art. 45(1)Cyber threat information sharing

Financial entities may exchange cyber threat information and intelligence among themselves to strengthen their digital operational resilience.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 45 (Official Journal)
Outside what a test can evidence.

Reporting deadlines

DeadlineWhat must be reportedToReference
As early as possible, within four hours from classification as major and no later than 24 hours from becoming aware of the incident (if classified as major later, within four hours of classification)Initial notification of a major ICT-related incidentRelevant competent authorityDORA Art. 19(1), 19(4); RTS 2025/301 Art. 5(1)(a), 5(2)
At the latest within 72 hours from the submission of the initial notificationIntermediate reportRelevant competent authorityRTS 2025/301 Art. 5(1)(b)
No later than one month after the intermediate report or, where applicable, the latest updated intermediate reportFinal reportRelevant competent authorityRTS 2025/301 Art. 5(1)(c)
Without undue delayInformation to clients where a major ICT-related incident has an impact on their financial interestsAffected clients (not the competent authority)DORA Art. 19(3)

Frequently asked questions

Is a penetration test the same as TLPT under DORA?

No. TLPT is the advanced testing that Article 26 requires, at least every three years, of the entities that competent authorities identify under Article 26(8) and Article 2 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (for example G-SII and O-SII credit institutions, central securities depositories and central counterparties, unless the assessment shows TLPT is not justified), and the TLPT RTS sets its phases, including a threat intelligence step and a red team test run under a control team. A standard penetration test can be one of the tests listed in Article 25(1) and can support the Article 24 programme. AssurePort does not present its scans as TLPT.

Does DORA apply to SaaS vendors?

DORA directly regulates the financial entities in Article 2(1). Article 2(1)(u) names ICT third-party service providers, and the direct oversight regime for providers designated as critical starts at Article 31. A SaaS vendor that is not designated is not supervised under that regime, but its financial customers must put the Article 28 and 30 terms into their contracts. Whether a particular clause applies is a question for legal advisers.

How fast must a major ICT incident be reported under DORA?

The RTS on incident reporting, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, sets three stages: an initial notification within four hours from classification as major and no later than 24 hours from awareness, an intermediate report within 72 hours from the initial notification, and a final report no later than one month after the intermediate report or, where applicable, the latest updated intermediate report. The four-hour limit runs from classification as major; the 24-hour limit runs from awareness.

Does DORA require an annual penetration test?

DORA does not name a penetration test as mandatory for every system each year. Article 24(6) requires appropriate tests, at least yearly, on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions, and Article 25(1) lists penetration testing among the tests a programme provides for. Which tests are appropriate is a risk-based judgement under Article 24(3).

Which entities can use the simplified ICT risk management framework?

Article 16(1) sets a simplified framework for a narrow group: small and non-interconnected investment firms, exempted payment institutions, certain institutions exempted under Directive 2013/36/EU, exempted electronic money institutions, and small institutions for occupational retirement provision. Insurance undertakings are not on that list. Check the exact wording of Article 16(1) against the entity size and interconnectedness before drawing a conclusion.

Regular testing that produces evidence

AssurePort runs web, API, network and cloud penetration tests, an Active Directory security assessment and GitHub SAST, from $399 to $2,299 per scan, with a reproducible proof for each confirmed finding. They are not threat-led penetration tests under DORA.

Sources