The EU Cyber Resilience Act: what manufacturers must do in practice

The Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) sets cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements made available on the EU market: software, connected hardware and their remote data processing solutions. The reporting duties for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents apply from 11 September 2026. The main obligations apply from 11 December 2027. This guide sets out what a manufacturer has to do, in order, and where security testing fits.

Official text: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 – Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act)

Who it applies to

The regulation covers products with digital elements. Article 3(1) defines these as a software or hardware product and its remote data processing solutions. Article 2(1) applies the regulation to products with digital elements made available on the market whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. "Placing on the market" means the first making available of a product on the Union market, and "making available on the market" means supply for distribution or use in the course of a commercial activity, whether in return for payment or free of charge (Article 3). The duties of importers and distributors sit in their own articles, which this guide does not cover in detail.

Article 2(2) to (4) carve out products already covered by sector rules: products to which Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and 2017/746 (medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices) or Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 (motor vehicles) apply, products certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 (civil aviation), and equipment within the scope of Directive 2014/90/EU (marine equipment). Under Article 2(5), the application of this regulation to products covered by other Union rules may be limited or excluded where that is consistent with the regulatory framework for those products and the sectoral rules achieve the same or a higher level of protection; the Commission specifies this by delegated act. Article 2(6) excludes spare parts made available to replace identical components and manufactured to the same specifications, and Article 2(7) excludes products developed or modified exclusively for national security or defence purposes and products specifically designed to process classified information.

Standalone SaaS. Article 3(1) does not name software-as-a-service. The regulation reaches cloud components through the concept of remote data processing: data processing at a distance for which the software is designed and developed by the manufacturer, or under its responsibility, and the absence of which would prevent the product from performing one of its functions (Article 3(2)). Recital 12 says that cloud solutions are remote data processing solutions only if they meet that definition. Its example inside scope is cloud functionality from a smart home device manufacturer that lets users control the device at a distance. Outside scope are websites that do not support the functionality of a product with digital elements and cloud services designed and developed outside the responsibility of a product manufacturer. The same recital states that Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) applies to cloud computing services and service models such as Software as a Service (SaaS). Recital 11 adds that a service developed by the manufacturer that provides an API or database a mobile application needs is within scope as a remote data processing solution. Whether a particular cloud back end falls inside the definition depends on how the product works, so it is assessed case by case.

Open-source software. Article 3 defines free and open-source software and the "open-source software steward", a legal person other than a manufacturer that systematically supports, on a sustained basis, the development of specific free and open-source products intended for commercial activities, and ensures their viability (Article 3(14)). Recital 18 says that the provision of free and open-source products that are not monetised by their manufacturers should not be considered a commercial activity. Stewards have their own duties under Article 24: a cybersecurity policy documented in a verifiable manner, cooperation with market surveillance authorities, and that documentation supplied on a reasoned request. Article 24(3) applies the Article 14(1) reporting duty to stewards to the extent that they are involved in development, and Article 14(3) and (8) to the extent that severe incidents affect systems they provide for development. A manufacturer that integrates third-party components, including open-source components not made available in a commercial activity, must exercise due diligence (Article 13(5)).

Sources: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 2 and Article 3 (EUR-Lex); Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Recitals 11, 12 and 18 and Article 24 (Official Journal); European Commission, Cyber Resilience Act page

Key dates

DateWhat happensSource
The regulation enters into force, on the twentieth day after its publication in the Official Journal (20 November 2024)Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 71(1)
Chapter IV (Articles 35 to 51), on conformity assessment bodies, starts to applyRegulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 71(2)
Article 14 applies: reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidentsRegulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 71(2); Commission CRA page
The regulation applies generally; the main obligations apply from this dateRegulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 71(2); Commission CRA page

What a manufacturer has to do under the Cyber Resilience Act

Before a product is placed on the market, the manufacturer must design, develop and produce it in accordance with the essential cybersecurity requirements in Annex I, Part I (Article 13(1)). To decide which of those requirements apply, it carries out a documented risk assessment covering the intended purpose, foreseeable use, operating environment and expected lifetime. The assessment states how the Part I, point (2) requirements and the Part II vulnerability handling requirements are applied, is kept up to date during the support period, and goes into the technical documentation (Article 13(2) to (4)).

Before placing the product on the market, the manufacturer also draws up the technical documentation and carries out the conformity assessment procedure for the product class (Article 13(12) and Article 32). After placing it on the market, the manufacturer handles vulnerabilities effectively for the whole support period (Article 13(8)) and reports under Article 14.

Essential cybersecurity requirements (Annex I, Part I)

Annex I, Part I, point (1) requires products to be designed, developed and produced so as to ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks. Point (2) lists the security requirements that the risk assessment decides apply, in sub-points (a) to (m).

Some sub-points concern the state in which the product is supplied: being made available on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities (point (2)(a)), a secure by default configuration, unless otherwise agreed with a business user for a tailor-made product, including the possibility to reset the product to its original state (point (2)(b)), and the ability to address vulnerabilities through security updates, including, where applicable, automatic security updates enabled as a default setting with a clear and easy-to-use opt-out, notification of available updates, and the option to temporarily postpone them (point (2)(c)). Others concern access and data. Protection against unauthorised access, with reporting of possible unauthorised access, is in point (2)(d). Confidentiality, for example through encryption at rest and in transit, is in point (2)(e), and integrity of data, commands, programs and configuration is in point (2)(f). Point (2)(g) limits processing to the data that is necessary for the intended purpose.

Availability of essential and basic functions, also after an incident, including through resilience and mitigation measures against denial-of-service attacks, is covered by point (2)(h), and minimising the negative impact of the product or connected devices on the availability of services provided by other devices or networks by point (2)(i). Point (2)(j) asks for limited attack surfaces, including external interfaces. Point (2)(k) asks for the impact of an incident to be reduced through exploitation mitigation. Point (2)(l) asks for relevant internal security activity to be recorded and monitored, with a user opt-out, and point (2)(m) for users to be able to securely and easily remove all data and settings on a permanent basis.

Vulnerability handling, updates and the support period (Annex I, Part II)

Annex I, Part II sets out the vulnerability handling requirements. Manufacturers of products with digital elements must, in summary: identify and document vulnerabilities and components, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine-readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies (point (1)); address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay, including by providing security updates, with new security updates provided separately from functionality updates where technically feasible (point (2)); apply effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements (point (3)); once a security update has been made available, share and publicly disclose information about fixed vulnerabilities, with delay allowed in duly justified cases until users have had the possibility to apply the patch (point (4)); put in place and enforce a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure (point (5)); take measures to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities, including by providing a contact address for reports (point (6)); provide mechanisms to distribute updates securely so that vulnerabilities are fixed or mitigated in a timely manner, automatically for security updates where applicable (point (7)); and disseminate available security updates without delay, free of charge unless otherwise agreed with a business user for a tailor-made product, with advisory messages for users (point (8)).

The support period is set under Article 13(8). The manufacturer determines it so that it reflects the time the product is expected to be in use, taking into account reasonable user expectations and the nature of the product. It must be at least five years, unless the product is expected to be in use for less, in which case it matches the expected use time. The reasoning is recorded in the technical documentation. Each security update made available during the support period must remain available for at least 10 years after it is issued, or for the rest of the support period if that is longer (Article 13(9)).

Components are part of the same duty. Under Article 13(6), a manufacturer that finds a vulnerability in an integrated component, including an open-source component, reports it to the person or entity manufacturing or maintaining the component, and addresses and remediates it under Part II. Where it has developed a modification to address the vulnerability, it shares the relevant code or documentation with that person or entity, where appropriate in a machine-readable format.

How fast to report an exploited vulnerability or severe incident (Article 14)

Manufacturers must notify actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents affecting the security of a product through the single reporting platform referred to in Article 16. Each notification goes simultaneously to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and to ENISA (Article 14(1) and (3)); it is submitted through the electronic notification end-point of the coordinating CSIRT of the Member State of the main establishment of the manufacturer in the Union and is simultaneously accessible to ENISA (Article 14(7)). Article 14(5) defines what counts as a severe incident.

For an actively exploited vulnerability, Article 14(2) sets three stages. The early warning is due without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of the manufacturer becoming aware of it. The vulnerability notification is due without undue delay and in any event within 72 hours of becoming aware. The final report is due no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available. For a severe incident, Article 14(4) sets an early warning without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours, an incident notification without undue delay and in any event within 72 hours, and a final report within one month after the incident notification is submitted. The later stages are not required where the relevant information has already been provided. Article 14(8) also requires the manufacturer, after becoming aware, to inform impacted users, and where appropriate all users, of the vulnerability or incident and, where necessary, of risk mitigation and corrective measures they can deploy.

The clock runs from awareness, so detection and triage processes matter as much as the form. None of the engines on this site files these notifications on a manufacturer's behalf. Products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are generally subject to the regulation only if they are substantially modified from that date (Article 69(2)), but by way of derogation the Article 14 obligations apply to all in-scope products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 (Article 69(3)).

Default, important and critical products, conformity routes and fines

Most products fall in the default category. Annex III lists important products in two classes. Class I has 19 categories, among them operating systems, and routers, modems intended for the connection to the internet, and switches. Class II has four, among them hypervisors and container runtime systems, and firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems. Annex IV lists critical products under three headings, including smart meter gateways and smartcards or similar devices, including secure elements.

Article 32(1) sets the general conformity routes: internal control under module A, EU-type examination with internal production control (modules B and C), full quality assurance (module H), or a European cybersecurity certification scheme where one is available and applies. For important class I products, Article 32(2) requires modules B and C or module H for the requirements concerned if harmonised standards, common specifications or certification schemes at assurance level at least substantial were not applied, were applied only in part, or do not exist. For important class II products, Article 32(3) allows modules B and C, module H, or a certification scheme at assurance level at least substantial. For critical products, Article 32(4) requires a certification scheme under Article 8(1) or, if those conditions are not met, the class II routes.

Article 64 sets the fine ceilings. Non-compliance with the Annex I essential requirements and with Articles 13 and 14 carries fines of up to EUR 15 000 000 or, for an undertaking, up to 2,5 % of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher (Article 64(2)). Non-compliance with the obligations listed in Article 64(3), among them Articles 18 to 23, Article 28, Article 30(1) to (4), Article 31(1) to (4) and Article 32(1) to (3), carries up to EUR 10 000 000 or 2 % on the same basis. Supplying incorrect, incomplete or misleading information to notified bodies and market surveillance authorities in reply to a request carries up to EUR 5 000 000 or 1 % (Article 64(4)). Member States lay down the penalty rules (Article 64(1)). Article 64(10) states that the fines referred to in paragraphs 2 to 9 (as corrected by the corrigendum of 2 July 2025) do not apply to manufacturers that qualify as microenterprises or small enterprises for a failure to meet the 24-hour early warning deadline in Article 14(2)(a) or 14(4)(a), or to any infringement by open-source software stewards.

Where security testing fits, and where it stops

Annex I, Part II, point (3) requires effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements, without naming a method. Penetration testing, code review and dependency review are all possible inputs. Test results can provide evidence for that point and inform the risk assessment under Article 13(2). They are not a conformity assessment, and AssurePort is not a notified body.

Testing maps unevenly onto the requirements. Web Pentest ($399 per scan) and API Pentest ($399 per scan) test a running web application or API, including authentication, access control and injection flaws. Each confirmed finding carries a reproducible proof, and findings we cannot prove are labelled unconfirmed. This evidence bears most directly on Annex I, Part I, points (2)(d) to (f) and on the risk assessment. A scan at one moment shows what was found at that time; it cannot show that no known exploitable vulnerability exists, which is the point (2)(a) requirement. Network / Host Pentest ($579 per scan) tests exposed hosts and services without logging in, and Cloud Pentest ($2,299 per scan) audits cloud configuration in read-only mode.

GitHub SAST ($399 per scan) reads a repository, including its git history, for exposed secrets, vulnerable dependencies, infrastructure-as-code and CI/CD configuration, and static analysis. It can inform Annex I, Part II, points (1) and (3). The GitHub SAST page describes the dependency part as a report of vulnerable packages, including transitive ones, with the path that pulls them in. It does not describe an SBOM export in the commonly used and machine-readable format that point (1) asks for, so check the output against that format before relying on it.

Testing also has limits of scope. AssurePort tests web applications, APIs, repositories, networks and cloud configurations. It does not test firmware or hardware. Many products under the regulation are devices, and those will need other evidence for the device-level requirements.

Obligations and where testing can contribute evidence

ReferenceWhat the text requiresWhere a penetration test can contribute evidence
Annex I, Part I, point (1)Design for an appropriate level of cybersecurity

Products are designed, developed and produced to ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
Outside what a test can evidence.
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(a)No known exploitable vulnerabilities when made available on the market

Products are made available on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
A test at a given date can show which known vulnerabilities were found or not found at that time; it cannot show that none exist.
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(b)Secure-by-default configuration and reset

Products are made available with a secure by default configuration, unless otherwise agreed with a business user for a tailor-made product, including the possibility to reset them to their original state.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
An external scan or configuration review can show whether insecure defaults are exposed in the tested deployment.
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(c)Capability to receive security updates

Vulnerabilities can be addressed through security updates, including, where applicable, automatic security updates enabled by default with a clear opt-out, notification of available updates, and the option to temporarily postpone them.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
Outside what a test can evidence.
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(d) to (f)Protection against unauthorised access, and of data confidentiality and integrity

Access controls protect against unauthorised access, and stored and transmitted data is protected for confidentiality and integrity.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
Penetration testing of authentication, authorisation and transport security can provide evidence for these points; a code review can show how encryption is implemented.
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(g) to (i)Data minimisation, availability of essential functions and no harm to other networks

Processing is limited to data that is adequate, relevant and necessary for the intended purpose, the availability of essential and basic functions is protected, also after an incident and including against denial-of-service attacks, and the negative impact on the availability of services provided by other devices or networks is minimised.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
Non-destructive external testing gives limited evidence here, because it cannot establish resistance to denial-of-service attacks.
Annex I, Part I, point (2)(j) to (m)Limited attack surface, exploitation mitigation, security logging and secure data removal

Attack surfaces are limited, the impact of incidents is reduced through exploitation mitigation, relevant security activity is recorded and monitored, and users can securely and easily remove all data and settings on a permanent basis.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part I
External testing can show exposed interfaces and services that should not be reachable; logging and data removal are checked by review rather than by an external test.
Annex I, Part II, point (1)Identify and document vulnerabilities and components, with an SBOM

Vulnerabilities and components are identified and documented, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine-readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
A dependency analysis of a repository can show known vulnerable components and the paths that pull them in; it does not by itself produce the machine-readable SBOM that this point asks for.
Annex I, Part II, point (2)Remediate vulnerabilities without delay

Vulnerabilities are addressed and remediated without delay, including by providing security updates, and new security updates are provided separately from functionality updates where technically feasible.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
A retest can show that a specific finding was fixed; it does not show that remediation happened without delay.
Annex I, Part II, point (3)Effective and regular tests and reviews of security

Manufacturers apply effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements. The point does not name a method.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II, point (3)
Penetration testing, code review and dependency review can provide evidence for this point and inform the risk assessment; the regulation does not name a method, and test results are not a conformity assessment.
Annex I, Part II, point (4)Public disclosure of fixed vulnerabilities

Once a security update has been made available, information about fixed vulnerabilities is shared and publicly disclosed; in duly justified cases publication may be delayed until users have had the possibility to apply the patch.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
Outside what a test can evidence.
Annex I, Part II, point (5)Coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy

A coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy is put in place and enforced. Article 13(8) also refers to these policies for handling reports from internal and external sources.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
Outside what a test can evidence.
Annex I, Part II, point (6)Information sharing and a contact address for reports

Measures are taken to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities in the product and its third-party components, including by providing a contact address for reporting them.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
Outside what a test can evidence.
Annex I, Part II, point (7)Secure, timely and automatic update distribution

Mechanisms are in place to distribute updates securely so that vulnerabilities are fixed or mitigated in a timely manner, and automatically for security updates where applicable.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
Outside what a test can evidence.
Annex I, Part II, point (8)Security updates disseminated without delay

Available security updates are disseminated without delay and, unless otherwise agreed with a business user for a tailor-made product, free of charge, with advisory messages for users.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Annex I, Part II
Outside what a test can evidence.
Article 13(2) and (3)Documented cybersecurity risk assessment

A documented cybersecurity risk assessment is carried out, kept up to date during the support period, and states which Annex I requirements apply and how they are implemented.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13
Test results are one input to the assessment; they do not replace it.
Article 13(5) and (6)Due diligence on third-party components and upstream reporting

Components sourced from third parties, including open-source components not made available in a commercial activity, are integrated with due diligence. Vulnerabilities found in components are reported to their maintainers.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13
A dependency review can identify vulnerable third-party components; it cannot assess how those components were developed.
Article 13(8)Support period of at least five years, or expected use time if shorter

The support period reflects the time the product is expected to be in use, is at least five years unless expected use is shorter, and the reasoning is recorded in the technical documentation.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13
Outside what a test can evidence.
Article 13(9)Security updates kept available for at least 10 years

Each security update made available during the support period remains available for at least 10 years after issue, or for the rest of the support period if longer.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13
Outside what a test can evidence.
Article 13(4), Article 31 and Annex VIITechnical documentation

The risk assessment is included in the technical documentation under Article 31 and Annex VII.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 13 and Article 31
Test reports can be kept with the technical documentation as supporting material.
Article 14(1) and (2)Report actively exploited vulnerabilities

Actively exploited vulnerabilities are notified to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and to ENISA through the single reporting platform, in three stages: early warning, vulnerability notification and final report.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 14
Outside what a test can evidence.
Article 14(3) and (4)Report severe incidents

Severe incidents affecting the security of the product are notified to the same recipients, in three stages: early warning, incident notification and final report.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 14
Outside what a test can evidence.
Article 14(8)Inform impacted users

After becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or severe incident, the manufacturer informs impacted users, and where appropriate all users, of the vulnerability or incident and, where necessary, of risk mitigation and corrective measures they can deploy.

Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Article 14
Outside what a test can evidence.

Reporting deadlines

DeadlineWhat must be reportedToReference
Without undue delay, and in any event within 24 hours of becoming awareEarly warning for an actively exploited vulnerabilityCSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA, through the single reporting platformArt. 14(2)(a)
Without undue delay, and in any event within 72 hours of becoming aware, unless the information has already been providedVulnerability notification: general information about the product, the general nature of the exploit and vulnerability, corrective or mitigating measures taken and measures users can takeCSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA, through the single reporting platformArt. 14(2)(b)
No later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available, unless the information has already been providedFinal report: description, severity and impact, any known malicious actor, and the security update or other corrective measureCSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA, through the single reporting platformArt. 14(2)(c)
Without undue delay, and in any event within 24 hours of becoming awareEarly warning for a severe incident, stating at least whether it is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious actsCSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA, through the single reporting platformArt. 14(4)(a)
Without undue delay, and in any event within 72 hours of becoming aware, unless the information has already been providedIncident notification: general information about the nature of the incident, an initial assessment, corrective or mitigating measures taken and measures users can takeCSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA, through the single reporting platformArt. 14(4)(b)
Within one month after the submission of the incident notification under point (b), unless the information has already been providedFinal report: detailed description, likely threat type or root cause, and applied and ongoing mitigation measuresCSIRT designated as coordinator and ENISA, through the single reporting platformArt. 14(4)(c)
After becoming aware; no fixed time limit is stated, but if users are not informed in a timely manner the coordinating CSIRTs may inform themInform impacted users, and where appropriate all users, of the vulnerability or incident and, where necessary, of risk mitigation and corrective measures they can deploy; in a structured, machine-readable format where appropriate.Impacted users, and where appropriate all usersArt. 14(8)

Frequently asked questions

Does the Cyber Resilience Act apply to SaaS?

Article 3(1) does not name software-as-a-service. The regulation covers software or hardware products and their remote data processing solutions. A cloud back end falls inside that concept when the manufacturer designs and develops it, or it is developed under its responsibility, and its absence would prevent the product from performing one of its functions (Article 3(2)). Recital 12 says that cloud solutions are covered only if they meet that definition, that cloud services designed and developed outside the responsibility of a product manufacturer are outside scope, and that Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) applies to cloud computing services such as SaaS. Whether a given service is in scope is a case-by-case assessment.

When does the Cyber Resilience Act apply?

The regulation entered into force on 10 December 2024. Chapter IV on conformity assessment bodies applies from 11 June 2026, Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the main obligations apply from 11 December 2027 (Article 71). The reporting duties therefore already apply to manufacturers today, and Article 69(3) applies them also to in-scope products placed on the market before 11 December 2027.

Does the Cyber Resilience Act require penetration testing?

The requirement is in Annex I, Part II, point (3): apply effective and regular tests and reviews of the security of the product with digital elements. The regulation does not name penetration testing as the method. A penetration test can provide evidence for that point and inform the risk assessment, but it is not a conformity assessment.

How fast must a manufacturer report an actively exploited vulnerability?

Under Article 14(2), the early warning is due without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware. The vulnerability notification follows without undue delay and in any event within 72 hours, and the final report no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available. All three go to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and to ENISA, through the single reporting platform.

Do open-source projects have to comply with the Cyber Resilience Act?

Free and open-source software that is not supplied in the course of a commercial activity is outside the making-available concept, which recital 18 explains; that recital also says the provision of free and open-source products not monetised by their manufacturers should not be considered a commercial activity. Supply in the course of a commercial activity brings a product within the regulation. Open-source software stewards have their own light-touch obligations under Article 24 (recital 19), and Article 64(10) states that the administrative fines referred to in Article 64(2) to (9) (as corrected by the corrigendum of 2 July 2025) do not apply to infringements by stewards, and a manufacturer that integrates third-party components must exercise due diligence (Article 13(5)).

Test the applications and code you ship

Web Pentest, API Pentest and GitHub SAST are $399 per scan; Network / Host Pentest is $579 and Cloud Pentest is $2,299, using the engine list prices. We do not test firmware or hardware, and a report from us is not a conformity assessment under the regulation.

Sources