Advisory

CVE-2026-67277: MikroTik RouterOS Missing Authentication Enables Memory Leak and Kernel Crash

A missing authentication flaw in MikroTik RouterOS allows any unauthenticated network attacker to trigger kernel memory disclosure and crash the router by abusing the bandwidth-test (btest) service before a primary session completes authentication. With a CVSS score of 8.2 (HIGH) and confirmed active exploitation tracked in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, organizations running affected RouterOS versions should patch immediately.

TL;DR: Update MikroTik RouterOS to version 6.49.21 (Long-term), 7.23.4 (Long-term), or 7.24.2 (Stable) or later; if patching is not immediately possible, restrict or disable the btest service at the network perimeter per vendor guidance.

What Is the Vulnerability?

CVE-2026-67277 is classified as a Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability (CWE-306) in MikroTik RouterOS. The flaw resides in the bandwidth-test (btest) service, which accepts a related btest connection before the corresponding primary session has finished authenticating.

An unauthenticated client that exploits this pre-authentication state can initiate an IPv4 UDP bandwidth test. Two separate weaknesses compound the exposure:

  • Kernel memory disclosure: When the test is run with random-data=false, the sender populates packet payloads from an uninitialized tail of a kernel packet buffer, potentially leaking in-memory data to any client that can receive the UDP stream.
  • Unsigned integer underflow and kernel crash: A separate unchecked, inverted packet-size interval causes an unsigned integer underflow. The resulting anomalously large fragmented output can restart the RouterOS kernel, constituting a denial-of-service condition.

The CVSS 3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H reflects that the attack is network-reachable, requires low complexity, needs no privileges, and requires no user interaction — with high availability impact and low confidentiality impact.

Who and What Is Affected?

The vulnerability affects MikroTik RouterOS in versions prior to the following fixed releases:

BranchFixed Version
Long-term (6.x)6.49.21
Long-term (7.x)7.23.4
Stable (7.x)7.24.2

Any MikroTik device running RouterOS with the btest service accessible — particularly those exposed to untrusted networks or the public internet — should be treated as at risk. MikroTik hardware is widely deployed as edge routers, VPN gateways, ISP customer-premises equipment, and enterprise core switching infrastructure, meaning the population of potentially affected devices is large and varied.

What Is the Impact?

Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-67277 can result in two distinct outcomes:

  • Kernel memory disclosure (Confidentiality: Low): Uninitialized kernel packet buffer contents transmitted to an unauthenticated client may contain residual in-memory data. The specific sensitivity of that data depends on the router's workload at the time of the test, but any unintended disclosure of kernel memory warrants concern.
  • Kernel restart / Denial of Service (Availability: High): The unsigned integer underflow triggered by the inverted packet-size interval produces anomalously large fragmented output that causes the RouterOS kernel to restart. For organizations relying on the affected device for routing, VPN termination, or firewall functions, a kernel restart means a complete — if potentially brief — loss of network connectivity.

The CISA KEV catalog entry confirms that this vulnerability has been exploited in the wild, and CISA added it on 2026-09-10, five days after NVD publication on 2026-09-05. CISA's required action references BOD 26-04 patching obligations for federal agencies, and CISA explicitly notes forensic triage requirements, suggesting that exploitation may have left indicators of compromise on affected devices.

There is no integrity impact listed in the CVSS vector, meaning the flaw alone does not appear to allow an attacker to modify router configuration or data — however, a successful denial-of-service or memory leak can serve as a component of a broader attack chain.

What Should You Do Now?

The vendor has released patches. The primary action is to update RouterOS:

  1. Identify all MikroTik RouterOS devices in your environment and record their current firmware versions using your asset inventory or network management tooling.
  2. Update to 6.49.21 (Long-term 6.x branch), 7.23.4 (Long-term 7.x branch), or 7.24.2 (Stable 7.x branch) using the MikroTik upgrade process documented in the vendor's official documentation.
  3. If patching cannot be applied immediately, restrict access to the btest service. This can be done by disabling the bandwidth-test server or by applying firewall rules (e.g., RouterOS /ip firewall filter) to block access to the btest port from untrusted sources — particularly from the public internet.
  4. Review device logs and, per CISA's guidance, consider forensic triage to determine whether the device has already been targeted. CISA's KEV entry references specific forensic triage requirements.
  5. Federal agencies must comply with BOD 26-04 patching timelines. For cloud services or cases where mitigation is unavailable, CISA directs consideration of discontinuing use of the affected product.

Consult the MikroTik vendor advisory, NVD entry for CVE-2026-67277, and the CISA KEV catalog for the most current guidance.

How External Testing Surfaces This Exposure

Because the flaw is exploitable by an unauthenticated, remote attacker with no special prerequisites, it is well-suited for detection through external, network-layer security testing. Specifically, point-in-time external assessments can help organizations understand their exposure in the following ways:

  • Service enumeration: An external scan can identify whether the RouterOS btest service port is reachable from outside the organization's network perimeter, confirming whether the attack surface is exposed to the internet.
  • Version fingerprinting: Banner responses and protocol-level fingerprinting can reveal whether a device is running a RouterOS version that predates the fixed releases (6.49.21, 7.23.4, 7.24.2), allowing prioritization of remediation.
  • Firewall rule validation: Testing confirms whether access controls intended to restrict btest access are functioning as configured, or whether misconfigurations leave the service reachable from untrusted network segments.

Because exploitation requires only network access and no credentials, any MikroTik device with btest reachable from an untrusted network should be treated as immediately at risk until patched or the service is confirmed inaccessible. External testing provides a point-in-time view of what an attacker on the internet would see — which is the perspective that matters most for this class of vulnerability.

Sources & further reading: NVD CVE-2026-67277 and the CISA KEV catalog are the authority on affected and fixed versions. Vendor/independent analysis: cert.pl, cert.pl, forum.mikrotik.com, forum.mikrotik.com. This advisory contains no exploit code.

Frequently asked questions

Does an attacker need credentials to exploit CVE-2026-67277?

No. The CVSS vector (PR:N, UI:N) and the NVD description both confirm that exploitation requires no privileges and no user interaction. The flaw is specifically that a 'related' btest connection is accepted before the primary session completes authentication, meaning the attacker bypasses the authentication requirement entirely.

Is this vulnerability being actively exploited?

Yes. CISA added CVE-2026-67277 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on 2026-09-10, confirming active exploitation in the wild. The KEV entry describes it as allowing kernel memory disclosure and denial of service in the btest service.

What RouterOS versions are safe?

MikroTik fixed the issue in RouterOS versions 6.49.21 (Long-term), 7.23.4 (Long-term), and 7.24.2 (Stable). Devices running any version prior to these on the respective branches should be updated as soon as possible.

If I cannot patch immediately, what is the fastest risk reduction step?

Restricting or disabling access to the btest service is the most direct interim mitigation. Ensure that the btest port is not reachable from the public internet or any untrusted network segment using RouterOS firewall filter rules or perimeter controls. This does not fix the underlying flaw but removes remote network access to the vulnerable function.